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Comment
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED SENTENCING
GUIDELINES FOR ORGANIZATIONS CONVICTED OF
ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES
I. INTRODUCTION
In February 1992, the United States Sentencing Commission (Sen-
tencing Commission) appointed an Advisory Working Group on Environ-
mental Sanctions (Advisory Group)' to help it draft Sentencing
Guidelines for organizations convicted of environmental offenses.2 On
March 5, 1993, the Advisory Group released a Working Draft (First Draft)
of recommended sentencing guidelines.3 After a May 10, 1993 public
hearing on the First Draft, the Advisory Group began preparing its final
draft recommendations. 4 On November 16, 1993, the Advisory Group for-
warded its final draft of the Proposed Guidelines for Organizations Con-
1. The members of the Advisory Group are: Sentencing Commission Chair
Michael S. Gelacak; Sentencing Commission Chair Ilene H. Nagel; Advisory Group
Chair Frederick R. Anderson, Esq., Partner - Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft; Ad-
visory Group Reporter Jonathan R. Turley, Professor of Law, The National Law
Center, George Washington University; Stephen M. Axinn, Esq., Partner - Skad-
den, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom; Jim Banks, Esq., Vice President & General
Counsel, Chemical Waste Management, Inc.; Jane Barrett, Esq., Assistant U.S. At-
torney, District of Maryland - Office of U.S. Attorney; ProfessorJohn C. Coffee, Jr.,
Columbia University School of Law; Douglas I. Foy, Executive Director, Conserva-
tion Law Foundation; Lloyd Guerci, Esq., Partner - Mayer, Brown & Platt; David
Hawkins, Esq., Staff Attorney - Natural Resources Defense Council; Meredith
Hemphil, Esq., Deputy General Counsel - Bethlehem Steel; Andrew E.
Lauterback, Esq., Regional Counsel - Criminal Enforcement U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency; Raymond W. Mushal, Senior Counsel, Environmental Crimes
Section - U.S. Department of Justice; Judson W. Starr, Esq., Partner - Venable,
Baetjer, Howard & Civiletti; John T. Subak, Esq., Group Vice President & General
Counsel - Rohm & Haas Co.; Larry Wallace, Esq., Partner - Hazel & Thomas; J.
Bryan Whitworth, Vice President, Corporate Relations & Services - Phillips Petro-
leum Company. Proposed Sentencing Guidelines § 9, at 34-35 (1993) [hereinafter
Proposed U.S.S.G.].
2. Memorandum Attached to Working Draft Recommendations, Mar. 5, 1993
[hereinafter First Draft]. Specifically, the Advisory Group was appointed to "assist
the Sentencing Commission in defining a package of effective sanctions for organi-
zations convicted of federal environmental crimes." Id.
3. Id. The Advisory Group noted that the First Draft was not a finished prod-
uct but rather "a discussion draft released as a vehicle for stimulating public com-
ment on issues related to sanctions for organizations convicted of federal
environmental crimes." Id.
4. See id. (instructing Working Group to meet after scheduled May 10, 1993
public hearing "to debate the terms of any final draft it votes to approve and for-
ward it to the Sentencing Commission").
(513)
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victed of Environmental Offenses (Proposed Guidelines) to the
Sentencing Commission. 5
The Sentencing Commission is currently considering the Proposed
Guidelines, public comments on them and any alternative proposals. Af-
ter a review period, the Sentencing Commission may accept or reject, in
whole or in part, the Proposed Guidelines.6 If the Sentencing Commis-
sion accepts the Proposed Guidelines it will submit them to Congress. 7
Once submitted to Congress, the Proposed Guidelines will be subject to a
180-day public comment period.8 After this comment period, assuming
Congress has not intervened in the meantime, the Proposed Guidelines
will take effect and become Chapter Nine of the Sentencing Guidelines. 9
This Comment analyzes the Proposed Guidelines as released by the
Advisory Group. Section II begins with a brief contextual history of the
Sentencing Guidelines 10 and concludes with a brief examination of under-
lying organizational sentencing issues.'1 Section III analyzes how the Pro-
posed Guidelines' provisions will work, if enacted. 12 Section IV then
compares certain provisions in the Proposed Guidelines with their coun-
terparts both in the First Draft13 and in the existing Federal Sentencing
Guidelines for organizations (Organizational Guidelines).14 Further-
5. Sentencing Commission Staff Memorandum, Dec. 6, 1993. The memoran-
dum noted that this draft was the "final report" of the Working Group and that the
Proposed Guidelines were "not a reflection of the Commission's position, but
rather a reflection of the [Working] Group's efforts to delimit the parameters of
what they determined was a viable and reasonable structure." Id.
6. First Draft, supra note 2. The Advisory Group did not have the authority to
forward its final proposal to Congress, but rather was instructed to submit the Pro-
posed Guidelines to the Sentencing Commission who would then submit them to
Congress. Id.
7. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(p) (1988) (establishing May 1 as deadline for promul-
gation of Guidelines by Sentencing Commission). The May 1, 1995 statutory dead-
line came and went without any promulgation.
8. See id. (stating that Guidelines take effect "no earlier than 180 days after
being so submitted and no later than the first day of November of the calendar
year in which the [Guidelines are] submitted"); see also First Draft, supra note 2
(noting 180-day period).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 994(p) (1988). The Guidelines take effect "except to the ex-
tent that the effective date is revised or the [Guidelines are] otherwise modified or
disapproved by Act of Congress." Id.
10. For a discussion of the contextual history of the Sentencing Guidelines,
see infra notes 17-30 and accompanying text.
11. For a discussion of underlying organizational sentencing issues, see infra
notes 31-65 and accompanying text.
12. For a discussion of how the Proposed Guidelines will work, see infra notes
66-140 and accompanying text.
13. For a comparison of the Proposed Guidelines provisions with comparable
provisions in the First Draft, see infra notes 141-61 and accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of the Organizational Guidelines provisions that apply to
organizations convicted of environmental offenses, see infra notes 31-46 and ac-
companying text. For a comparison of the Proposed Guidelines provisions with
comparable provisions in the existing Organizational Guidelines, see infra notes
162-89 and accompanying text.
514 [Vol. 40: p. 513
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more, Section IV also analyzes the extent to which the Proposed Guide-
lines will meet the basic statutory goals of the Sentencing Guidelines. 15
Finally, in Section V, this Comment concludes that the Proposed Guide-
lines are generally workable and consistent with statutory goals, but argues
that the Sentencing Commission should make several significant changes
to the Proposed Guidelines before submitting them to Congress.1 6
II. BACKGROUND
A. A Brief Histoiy of the Sentencing Guidelines
In 1984, Congress, by enacting the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA), es-
tablished the Sentencing Commission. 17 Congress created the Commis-
sion to further the following statutory sentencing goals: (1) to reflect the
seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law and to provide
just punishment;18 (2) to adequately deter criminal conduct; 19 (3) to pro-
tect the public from future criminal conduct;20 (4) to provide defendants
with effective educational training, vocational training, medical care, or
other correctional treatments;2 1 (5) to provide sentencing certainty and
fairness;22 (6) to avoid sentencing disparities among similarly situated
defendants; 23  and (7) to permit individualized sentencing when
warranted.24
15. For a discussion of how well the Proposed Guidelines meet the basic statu-
tory goals of the Sentencing Guidelines, see infra notes 190-236 and accompanying
text.
16. For a discussion of the workability and consistency of the Proposed Guide-
lines with the statutory goals, see infra notes 190-236 and accompanying text. For
recommended changes to the Proposed Guidelines, see infra notes 209-14 and
226-36 and accompanying text.
17. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3559 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)
(codifying Sentencing Reform Act (SRA)).
18. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2) (A) (1988); see also 28 U.S.C. § 991(b) (1) (A) (1988
& Supp. V 1993) (declaring that Sentencing Commission was established to assure
that purposes set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (a) (2) were met). For a discussion of
how well the Proposed Guidelines meet this statutory goal, see infra notes 192-201
and accompanying text.
19. Id. § 3553 (a) (2) (B). For a discussion of how well the Proposed Guide-
lines meet this statutory goal, see infra notes 202-08 and accompanying text.
20. Id. § 3553 (a) (2) (C). For a discussion of how well the Proposed Guidelines
meet this statutory goal, see infra notes 202-08 and accompanying text.
21. Id. § 3553(a) (2) (D). For a discussion of how well the Proposed Guide-
lines meet this statutory goal, see infra notes 209-14 and accompanying text.
22. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b) (1) (B). For a discussion of how well the Proposed
Guidelines meet this statutory goal, see infra notes 215-30 and accompanying text.
23. Id. For a discussion of how well the Proposed Guidelines meet this statu-
tory goal, see infra notes 231-36 and accompanying text.
24. Id. Individualized sentences are warranted when a case involves "mitigat-
ing or aggravating factors not taken into account in the establishment of general
sentencing practices." Id. For a discussion of how well the Proposed Guidelines
meet this statutory goal, see infra notes 231-36 and accompanying text.
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Three years after Congress gave the Sentencing Commission its man-
date, the first Sentencing Guidelines for individuals took effect.25 Initially,
the federal courts were divided over whether the SRA, the Sentencing
Commission and the Sentencing Guidelines were constitutional. 26 In
1989, however, the United States Supreme Court, in Mistretta v. United
States,2 7 upheld the constitutionality of the SRA and, thus the Sentencing
Commission and Sentencing Guidelines.28 Specifically, the Supreme
Court rejected the claim that Congress' delegation of sentencing powers
to the Sentencing Commission violated the doctrine of separation of pow-
ers. 29 After the Supreme Court decided Mistretta, Congress enacted Sen-
tencing Guidelines for individuals convicted of environmental crimes.
3 0
Next, the Sentencing Commission turned its efforts to developing
guidelines for crimes committed by organizations. These Organizational
Guidelines took effect on November 1, 1991.31 The Organizational
Guidelines apply to all organizations 32 convicted of a felony or a Class A
25. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 1
(Nov. 1993) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.]. The first Sentencing Guidelines for individu-
als took effect on November 1, 1987. Id.
26. Compare, e.g., Gubiensio-Ortiz v. Kanahele, 857 F.2d 1245, 1260-66 (9th
Cir. 1988) (invalidating Sentencing Guidelines on separation of powers grounds),
vacated, 488 U.S. 1036 (1989) with United States v. Frank, 864 F.2d 992, 1012-16
(3d Cir. 1988) (upholding constitutionality of Sentencing Guidelines), cert. denied,
490 U.S. 1095 (1989).
27. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
28. Id. at 371-412. The defendant in Mistretta pleaded guilty to one count of
conspiracy and agreement to distribute cocaine and was sentenced under the Sen-
tencing Guidelines to 18 months imprisonment followed by three years of super-
vised release. Id. at 370-71. The defendant appealed, arguing that the Sentencing
Guidelines were unconstitutional because "the Sentencing Commission was consti-
tuted in violation of the established doctrine of separation of powers, and that
Congress delegated excessive authority to the Commission to structure the Guide-
lines." Id. at 370.
29. Id. at 412. Additionally, the defendant in Mistretta unsuccessfully argued
that Congress violated the nondelegation doctrine by delegating legislative powers
to the judicial branch. Id. at 371-79. Under the nondelegation doctrine, Congress
is prohibited from delegating its legislative powers to another branch of the fed-
eral government. See id. at 372 (citing Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892)
(defining nondelegation doctrine)).
30. 18 U.S.C. app. § 2Ql.1 [hereinafter U.S.S.G. § 2Q1.1] These guidelines
were enacted on November 1, 1989 and by their terms, do not apply to organiza-
tions. Id.
31. U.S.S.G., supra note 25, § 8. The new Proposed Guidelines would supple-
ment the Organizational Guidelines by providing sentencing guidelines for organi-
zations convicted of environmental offenses. See generally Proposed U.S.S.G., supra
note 1, § 9.
32. U.S.S.G., supra note 25, § 8A1.1. An organization is defined as "a person
other than an individual" for purposes of the Organizational Guidelines. Id. at
application n.1 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 18). The Proposed Guidelines use an identical
definition. For the definition of "organization" under the Proposed Guidelines, see
infra note 66 and accompanying text.
516
4
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 2 [1995], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol40/iss2/7
1995] COMMENT 517
misdemeanor. 33 Thus, organizations convicted of environmental felonies
or Class A misdemeanors are currently subject to the Organizational
Guidelines' provisions regarding restitution,3 4 remedial orders, 3 5 commu-
nity service, 3 6 notification of victims3 7 and organizational probation.
3 8
However, the Organizational Guidelines' provisions regarding fines specif-
ically exclude environmental offenses.39 Although the Organizational
Guidelines give no explicit reason for this exclusion, the Sentencing Com-
mission determined that environmental crimes are different from other
organizational crimes. 40  Four main factors contributed to this
determination.
41
33. U.S.S.G., supra note 25, § 8AL.1. The Organizational Guidelines are
"designed so that the sanctions imposed upon organizations and their agents, taken
together, will provide just punishment, adequate deterrence, and incentives for
organizations to maintain internal mechanisms for preventing, detecting, and re-
porting criminal conduct." Id. § 8 introductory commentary (emphasis added).
The Organizational Guidelines do not govern the sentencing of agents; rather,
individual agents of organizations are sentenced in accordance with guidelines in
the full seven chapters of the Sentencing Guidelines. Id. §§ 1-7.
34. Id. § 8B1.1. Courts must order restitution either when statutorily author-
ized under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663-3664, or as a condition of probation, unless either
the organization has already made full restitution, or if, on balance, it would be too
burdensome to determine an appropriate restitution amount. Id.
35. Id. § 8B1.2. Under the Organizational Guidelines, remedial orders sup-
plement probationary restitution. Id. § 8B1.2(a). Courts may also require organi-
zations to "create a trust fund sufficient to address [the reasonably estimated]
expected [future] harm." Id. § 8B1.2(b).
36. Id. § 8B1.3. This section is not mandatory, but courts may order proba-
tionary community service "where such community service is reasonably designed
to repair the harm caused by the offense." Id. The commentary to this section
indicates that community service is "an indirect monetary sanction" because orga-
nizations have to pay for their employees to perform these services. Id. § 8B1.3
commentary.
37. Id. § 8B1.4 (applying U.S.S.G., supra note 25, § 5F1.4, which provides that
"[t] he court may order the defendant to pay the cost of giving notice to victims").
This cost may be deducted from any fine if the court decides that imposing both a
fine and requiring notice to victims is too burdensome. Id. § 5F1.4.
38. Id. § 8D. If the Proposed Guidelines are enacted, organizational proba-
tion will be determined in accordance with them. See Proposed U.S.S.G., supra
note 1, § 9F.
39. See U.S.S.G., supra note 25, § 8C2.1 background commentary. Fines for
organizational environmental offenses are left to the statutory provisions defining
offenses and allowable sentences. See id. § 8C2.10.
40. See Ilene H. Nagel & Winthrop M. Swenson, The Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines for Corporations: Their Development, Theoretical Underpinnings, and Some Thoughts
About Their Future, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 205, 256 (1993) (stating that Sentencing Com-
mission reached "consensus" that environmental and other organizational offenses
are different enough "to warrant separate treatment"). The Justice Department
agreed with the Sentencing Commission on this point. Id.
41. See id. at 256-58 (stating four factors that lead to conclusion that environ-
mental crimes are sufficiently different from other organizational crimes to leave
former out of provisions of Organizational Guidelines).
5
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First, loss calculations 42 are more difficult to make when environmen-
tal offenses have been committed, especially if the offense causes damages
that are not ascertainable for clean-up purposes.43 Second, environmen-
tal statutes are more likely to involve weakened intent requirements, such
as negligence or even strict liability.44 Third, environmental offenses are
more likely to be "subject to overlapping enforcement schemes and collat-
eral sanctions."45 Finally, at the time, public and commentator opinions
were divided over how much weight to give environmental concerns as
opposed to business concerns. 46 All four of these factors most likely led
the Sentencing Commission to conclude that environmental crimes are
different enough from other organizational crimes to exclude the former
from the fine provisions of the Organizational Guidelines.
B. Increased Environmental Enforcement
While the debate over the propriety and scope of sentencing guide-
lines for organizations convicted of environmental crimes continued, the
general enforcement of environmental statutes and regulations continued
to increase. 4 7 Motivated in part by the public's concern with environmen-
tal issues, the federal government has steadily increased its environmental
prosecutions since 1982.48 Further, sentences for violations of environ-
42. For a discussion of loss calculations under the Organizational Guidelines,
see infra note 169 and accompanying text. For a discussion of loss calculations
under the Proposed Guidelines, see infra notes 181-84 and accompanying text.
43. Nagel & Swenson, supra note 40, at 256 (providing air emission violations
as example).
44. Id. at 256-57. Nagel and Swenson offer the Refuse Act as an example
under which "it is a crime to discharge any refuse matter into a navigable water of
the United States . . . without a permit." Id. (citing Refuse Act, 33 U.S.C. § 407
(1988)). The Refuse Act is a strict liability statute. See United States v. American
Cyanamid Co., 354 F. Supp. 1202, 1205 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 480 F.2d 1132 (2d Cir.
1973) (holding that scienter is not required to prove violation of Refuse Act). For
a discussion of the impact of scienter requirements (or the lack thereof) on sen-
tencing under the Proposed Guidelines, see infra notes 224-25 and accompanying
text.
45. Nagel & Swenson, supra note 40, at 258. As an example, Nagel and Swen-
son suggest that state and local governments are more likely to be involved in the
prosecution of environmental crimes than other organizational crimes. Id.
46. Id. Nagel and Swenson characterize environmental and business con-
cerns as polar extremes and point out that the differing viewpoints are held much
more strongly than they would be, for example, in the context of tax or fraud
violations. Id.
47. See, e.g., Jerry Seper, Environmental Crime Indictments Rise 33 Percent Over
Previous Year, WAsH. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1990, at A3 (indicating 33% increase in envi-
ronmental indictments between fiscal years 1989 and 1990).
48. See id. Agencies responsible for environmental enforcement have seen an
increase in resources as well. Laura M. Litvan, The Growing Ranks of Enviro-Cops,
NATION'S Bus., June, 1994, at 29. Environmental enforcement agents grew in
number from 47 in 1989 to 123 in 1994. Id. In addition, funding for the Environ-
mental Protection Agency's environmental crime section has increased 400% since
1989, while the total agency budget has increased by only 29%. Id.
[Vol. 40: p. 513
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mental laws have become more severe, due in part to the enactment of
environmental Sentencing Guidelines for individual offenses.4 9 At the
same time, organizations make up a significant percentage of environmen-
tal offense defendants. 50 Accordingly, while the Advisory Group was con-
cerned with increased environmental enforcement, it was nevertheless
mindful of underlying organizational liability issues.
C. Underlying Organizational Liability Issues
Since the Supreme Court's decision in New York Central & Hudson
River Railroad Co. v. United States,51 organizations have been held vicari-
ously liable for the federal criminal offenses of its employees and agents
acting within the scope of their employment or agency. 52 Further, vicari-
ous liability may be imposed even when the employee acts contrary to his
or her organization's policies.5 3 This principle raises the concern that or-
ganizations may be unfairly punished for acts in which their management
did not actively (through commission) or passively (through knowledge of
the act) participate. 54
49. See Mark A. Cohen, Environmental Crime and Punishment: Legal/Economic
Theory and Empirical Evidence on Enforcement of Federal Environmental Statutes, 82 J.
CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1054, 1078-79 (1992) (noting that median total criminal
sanction for organizations rose from $35,725 before enactment of 1984 Fine Act to
$63,859 after enactment, and likewise mean total criminal sanction for organiza-
tions rose from $108,786 to $443,882 during the same time frame). Cohen found
that, during this period of time, organizations convicted of environmental offenses
were sentenced to smaller fines than antitrust and other organizational offenders,
but that when restitution and other sanctions were included in the computations,
the mean and median "total" sanctions of the two groups were comparable. Id. at
1079.
50. See id. at 1074-75 (noting that between 1983 and 1990, corporations made
up 32% of all Justice Department prosecutions for environmental crimes). In
1992, corporations made up a whopping 61% of cases initiated by the U.S. Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency. Litvan, supra note 48, at 30. However, this figure
plummeted to 25% in 1993. Id. at 30-31.
51. 212 U.S. 481 (1909).
52. Id. at 491-92. Vicarious liability is defined as "liability, where the defend-
ant, generally one conducting a business, is made liable, though without personal
fault, for the bad conduct of someone else, generally his employee." WAYNE R.
LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. Scorr, JR., CRIMINAL LAw § 3.9, at 250 (2d ed. 1986).
In New York Central & Hudson River R.R, a railroad company was convicted for
rebates that its assistant traffic manager offered and paid to sugar companies. Id.
at 489. Under the Elkins Act, any "act, omission or failure of any officer, agent or
other person acting for or employed by any common carrier, acting within the
scope of his employment, shall in every case ... be deemed to be the act, omission
or failure of such carrier .... Id. at 491-92 (quoting 32 Stat. 847(1)).
53. See, e.g., United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1004 (9th
Cir. 1972) (holding hotel liable for illegal threats of purchasing agent acting in
course and scope of employment despite fact that purchasing agent was acting
contrary to company policy and specific instructions of manager and assistant man-
ager of hotel), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973).
54. See generally Pamela H. Bucy, Organizational Sentencing Guidelines: The Cart
Before the Horse, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 329, 334 (1993) (arguing that vicarious liability
standards "fail to consider the culpability of the corporation itself").
19951
7
Kracht: A Critical Analysis of the Proposed Sentencing Guidelines for Org
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1995
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
Vicarious liability is even more significant in the area of environmen-
tal offenses because many environmental statutes are "general intent" stat-
utes. Under such statutes, a defendant is convicted if a violative act is
"intentional and not the result of accident or mistake." 55 At least one fed-
eral court of appeals has interpreted "general intent" statutes to mean that
high-level management does not have to know that an employee actually
committed an unlawful act to be held criminally responsible.56 Further-
more, many environmental statutes explicitly impose strict liability, which
means that an organization may be held vicariously liable for conduct of
an employee who has no criminal intent whatsoever. 5 7
Another basic organizational liability issue is how to punish organiza-
tions. The Advisory Group faced two competing approaches to organiza-
tional punishment: the "optimal penalties" approach and the "economic
gain plus cost" approach. Under the "optimal penalties" approach, courts
base fines on the amount of harm caused by an offense and the probability
of convicting the organization. 58 The policy behind this approach is de-
terrence;59 as a result, merely placing organizations on probation is
strongly discouraged. 60
Under the "economic gain plus cost" approach, an entity's fine is de-
termined by considering the economic gain to the entity generated by the
offense and the economic cost or harm caused by the entity as a result of
the offense. 6 1 The foundation of this approach is a concern for just pun-
ishment and deterrence. 62 Unlike the "optimal penalties" approach, how-
ever, "economic gain plus cost" determinations permit the imposition of
probation. 63
55. See Intent, Knowledge Key to Prosecution of Corporate Officers, DOJ Official Says,
BNA NATIONAL ENVIRONMENT DAILY, Aug. 12, 1993, at 1 (discussing definition
given by Charles A. DeMonaco, assistant chief of Environmental Crimes Section of
Justice Department).
56. See United States v. Brittain, 931 F.2d 1413, 1419 (10th Cir. 1991) (imput-
ing "willfulness" or "negligence" of employee to high level manager because of
manager's "position of responsibility").
57. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 136(1) (b) (4) (1988) (providing for vicarious liability
upon principals, which includes organizations in Federal Insecticide, Fungicide &
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)).
58. See Nagel & Swenson, supra note 40, at 217-26 (discussing "optimal penal-
ties" approach in context of deliberations over Organizational Guidelines).
59. See id. at 210 (finding "optimal penalties" approach squarely fits within
"deterrence paradigm").
60. Id. at 220. The "pure optimal penalties approach" took the position that
organizational probation "was never an appropriate sanction." Id.
61. See id. at 233 (noting that both economic gain to organization and eco-
nomic loss caused by organization are considerations under Organizational
Guidelines).
62. Nagel & Swenson, supra note 40, at 234. "With a structure basis for focus-
ing the fine guidelines on just punishment and deterrence, the real question for
the Commission became not whether, but how to build just punishment and deter-
rence principles into the fine guidelines." Id.
63. See id. (discussing the imposition of probation).
[Vol. 40: p. 513
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Ultimately, the Advisory Group adopted the "economic gain plus
cost" approach for the Proposed Guidelines, but synthesized aspects of the
"optimal penalties" approach into the final theory.64 For example, the
Proposed Guidelines' emphasis on deterrence, which is the foundation of
the "optimal penalties" approach, demonstrates the synthesis of the two
approaches.6 5 This general characterization of the Proposed Guidelines
approach does not, however, adequately describe how the Proposed
Guidelines will be used by courts to determine penalties, if enacted. Such
a description is presented in the following section.
III. How THE PROPOSED GUIDELINES WILL WORK
Assuming that the Proposed Guidelines are enacted by Congress, they
will become Chapter Nine of the Sentencing Guidelines and apply to all
"organizations" convicted of environmental violations. 66 The Proposed
Guidelines provide district courts with a step-by-step process to determine
appropriate sentences for these organizations. 67 First, a, court must deter-
mine whether to fine the organization.6" This determination is based
upon the nature of the organization, 69 the nature of the offense,70 the
presence of aggravating and mitigating factors, 7 1 as well as the ability of
the organization to pay the fine. 72 Second, a court must determine
64. Proposed U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 9E1.2(d). A similar approach was used
in the Organizational Guidelines. See U.S.S.G., supra note 25, § 8C2.4 (stating gain
or cost relevant to base fine, not gain plus cost).
65. For a discussion of deterrence under the Proposed Guidelines, see infra
notes 202-08 and accompanying text.
66. Proposed U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 9Al.1. Under the Guidelines, an "or-
ganization" is defined as "a person other than an individual." Id. § 9A1.1 commen-
tary (citing 18 U.S.C. § 18 (1988)). These organizations include "corporations,
partnerships, associations, joint-stock companies, unions, trusts, pension funds, un-
incorporated organizations, governments and political subdivisions thereof, and
non-profit organizations." Id.
67. Id. § 9A1.2 (prescribing determinations to be made under the Proposed
Guidelines).
68. Id. § 9A1.2(a) (presenting steps to determine whether to fine
organization).
69. Id. § 9A1.2(a) (1); see also id. § 9B1.1 (presenting section on determining
Fine-Criminal Purpose Organizations). For a discussion on the sentencing of crim-
inal purpose organizations, see infra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
70. Id. § 9A1.2(a) (2); see also id. § 9B2.1 (determining primary offense level).
For a discussion of the determination of the offense level for non-criminal purpose
organizations, see infra notes 78-84 and accompanying text.
71. Id. § 9A1.2(b); see also id. §§ 9C1.1-.2 (determining application of aggra-
vating and mitigating factors in sentencing); id. § 9D (determining mitigation
based on organization's previous environmental compliance). For a discussion of
aggravating and mitigating factors, see infra notes 85-108 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of mitigation due to an organization's previous environmental
compliance, see infra notes 95-108 and accompanying text.
72. Id. § 9A1.2(c)(2); see also id. § 9E1.2 (describing general limitations
designed to ensure that organization can pay fine). For a discussion of these gen-
eral limitations, see infra notes 113-22 and accompanying text.
1995]
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whether to put the organization on probation. 73 The following sections
discuss in detail how a court will make such determinations.
A. Fines
1. "Criminal Purpose Organizations"
First the court must determine if the organization is a "criminal pur-
pose organization." 74 If the court finds that the organization "operated
primarily for a criminal purpose or primarily by criminal means," 75 then it
must fine the organization as a "criminal purpose organization." The
amount of the fine must be "sufficient to divest the organization of all of
its net assets."76 However, this fine cannot be greater than the statutory
maximum for the offense. 77
2. All Other Organizations
For all other organizations, the court must follow a step-by-step pro-
cess in determining whether to impose a fine. 78 Initially, the court must
determine the primary offense level, then consider the effect of any appli-
cable aggravating and mitigating factors on the offense level and finally
calculate the resulting fine, subject to other limitations.79 These determi-
nations are briefly discussed in the next section.
73. Id. § 9A1.2(d); see also id. § 9F (defining mandatory and permissive uses of
organizational probation and appropriate conditions of probation). For a discus-
sion of the sentence of organizational probation, see infra notes 123-40 and accom-
panying text.
74. Proposed U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 9B1.1 (presenting section entitled "De-
termining the Fine-Criminal Purpose Organizations").
75. Id. The court makes this determination by examining "the nature and
circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the organiza-
tion." Id.
76. Id. § 9B1.1. The net assets of a "criminal purpose organization" are "the
assets remaining after payments of all legitimate claims against assets by known
innocent bona fide creditors." Id. § 9B1.I application note.
77. Id. § 9B1.1. Under the Proposed Guidelines, the statutory maximum is
determined with reference to 18 U.S.C. § 3571(c), which is entitled "Fines for Or-
ganizations." Id. § 9E1.2, application note 2 (determining fines with reference to
statutory maximum allowed by 18 U.S.C. § 3571(c)). The statutory maximum is
the greatest of (1) the amount specified in the law defining the substantive offense,
(2) twice the pecuniary gain or loss from the offense or (3) a default amount
according to the offense class, e.g. $500,000 for a felony. 18 U.S.C. § 3571(c),(d)
(1988).
78. Proposed U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 9B2.1 (outlining process to determine
fine for non-criminal purpose organization).
79. For a discussion of the primary offense level determination and aggravat-
ing and mitigating adjustment factors, see infra notes 80-122 and accompanying
text.
522 [Vol. 40: p. 513
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a. Primary Offense Level
Under the Proposed Guidelines, all environmental offenses fall into
one of six categories.8 0 Each category, except for one, has a "base offense
level," which is a number indicating the relative.seriousness of the offenses
in that category.8 1 Some categories contain additional "specific offense
characteristics" which, if present, increase the base offense level.8 2
For example, if the offense falls under the category of "Mishandling
of Hazardous or Toxic Substances: Recordkeeping, Tampering, and Falsi-
fication," then the base offense level is eight.83 However, if the specific
offense characteristic, defined as "result[ing] in a substantial likelihood of
death or serious bodily injury," is present, then the base offense level in-
creases by nine.84 The resulting new offense level is seventeen.
b. Aggravating Factors
The primary offense level, adjusted for any specific offense character-
istics, must then be increased if the court finds that aggravating circum-
stances are present.8 5 Under the Proposed Guidelines, management
involvement in the offense,8 6 an organization's past civil and criminal en-
80. Proposed U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 9B2.1(b). The categories range from
"Knowing Endangerment Resulting From Mishandling Hazardous or Toxic Sub-
stances, Pesticides, or Other Pollutants" to "Simple Recordkeeping and Reporting"
offenses. Id. The commentary lists statutory provisions defining substantive of-
fenses, but the list is not exclusive, as it refers to other statutory provisions listed in
the Statutory Index (U.S.S.G., supra note 25, App. A). Id.
81. See Proposed U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 9B2.1 (b) (establishing base offense
levels). In determining the base offense levels for different crimes, the Sentencing
Commission used empirical data and statutory language that indicated distinctions
between crimes. See U.S.S.G., supra note 25, § IA introductory commentary n.3.
The Advisory Group left the base offense level for the Wildlife Violations category
blank. Proposed U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 9B2.1 (b) (5) (A). The enacted Guide-
lines will have to fill in the base offense level for this category in order to make fine
determinations.
82. See Proposed U.S.S.G., supra note 1, §§ 9B2.1 (b) (2) (B), 9B2.1 (b) (3) (B),
9B2.1 (b) (4) (B), 9B2.1 (b) (5) (B) (identifying certain specific offense characteris-
tics). For an example of a specific offense characteristic, see infra notes 83-84 and
accompanying text.
83. Id. § 9B2.1(b)(2)(A).
84. Id. § 9B2.1(b) (2) (B) (ii).
85. Id. § 9C1.1.
86. Id. § 9Cl.I(a). Involvement by "substantial authority personnel" is more
serious (an offense level increase of six) than involvement by other supervisory
personnel (increase of one to four levels). Id. "Substantial authority personnel"
are those employees
who within the scope of their authority exercise a substantial measure of
discretion in acting on behalf of an organization. The term includes
high-level personnel, individuals who exercise substantial authority ...
and any other individuals who, although not a part of an organization's
management, nevertheless exercise substantial discretion when acting
within the scope of their authority ....
Id. § 9A1.2 commentary n.2(k). The court must determine whether an employee
meets this definition on a case-by-case basis. Id. § 9C1.1 commentary. However,
11
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vironmental record,8 7 violation of an order,88 concealment of the of-
fense89 and the absence of an environmental compliance program are all
specifically listed as aggravating circumstances. 90
c. Mitigating Factors
Next, the court must reduce the adjusted offense level if it determines
that mitigating factors are present.9 1 The Proposed Guidelines specify
three mitigating factors: cooperation with authorities and self-reporting of
violations,92 remedial assistance to victims beyond that which is legally re-
the commentary also indicates that plant managers and senior environmental com-
pliance personnel should be considered "substantial authority personnel." Id.
87. Id. § 9C(1.1(b),(c). The court examines the organization's civil and crimi-
nal environmental record for the five years preceding the offense. Id. Similar
criminal conduct, meaning "similar actions or omissions at the same or a different
location or facility whether or not such prior misconduct was adjudged a violation
of the same statutory provision as the instant offense," merits the most severe in-
crease. Id. §§ 9A1.2 commentary n.2(j) (defining "similar misconduct"), 9C1.1(b)
(requiring five level increase for "similar misconduct" at same facility).
88. Id. § 9C1.1(d). This includes violations of conditions of probation and
judicial, administrative and cease and desist orders. Id. However, these violations
are not considered part of an organization's past civil and criminal environmental
record. Id. § 9C1.1(c) commentary n.2. For a discussion of the civil and criminal
record factor, see supra note 87 and accompanying text.
89. Id. § 9C1.1(e). Concealment includes the knowing concealment of the
violation or the obstruction of an investigation by an employee. Id. This section
does not create a disclosure requirement where no disclosure otherwise exists. Id.
commentary. Furthermore, if concealment was part of the primary offense, or was
a specific offense characteristic, then it cannot be treated additionally as an aggra-
vating factor. Id.
90. Id. § 9C1.1(f). This aggravator also applies to organizations that have
compliance programs but that have "substantially failed to implement" them. Id.
The commentary to this section of the Proposed Guidelines clearly distinguishes
between this aggravator and the "Commitment to Environmental Compliance"
mitigator. Id. comment 1; see also id. § 9C1.2(a) (defining compliance program
that results in mitigating factor). First, to avoid this aggravator, an organization
simply needs a compliance program that "evidence[s], at a minimum, a genuine
organized effort to monitor, verify and bring about compliance with environmen-
tal requirements." Id. § 9C1.1 comment 1. Second, the prosecution bears the bur-
den of demonstrating that the organization does not have such a program. Id. For
a discussion of an organization's environmental compliance program as a mitiga-
tor, see infra notes 95-108 and accompanying text.
91. Proposed U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 9C1.2 (outlining adjustment process
for mitigating factors).
92. Id. § 9C1.2(b). The organization must self-report before the threat of dis-
closure or investigation is imminent and must fully cooperate with the authorities
in any investigation to benefit from this mitigator. Id. § 9C1.2(b)(1). Full cooper-
ation includes providing authorities with all pertinent information the organiza-
tion knows, but it does not require reporting the names of individuals, or releasing
privileged information. Id. commentary. An organization may also mitigate, to a
lesser extent, by pleading guilty to the offense before the government is "put to
substantial effort or expense in preparing for trial" and then cooperating with the
government. Id. § 9C1.2(b)(2). The earlier and more fully the organization coop-
erates, the greater the mitigation. Id. § 9C1.2(b).
12
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quired 93 and demonstration of a "Commitment to Environmental
Compliance." 94
Of these mitigating factors, "Commitment to Environmental Compli-
ance" is the most significant 95 and controversial one.96 To have a "Com-
mitment to Environmental Compliance," an organization must be able to
demonstrate the following seven factors: (1) daily attention to compliance
with environmental laws and regulations by line management;9 7 (2) inte-
gration of environmental policies, standards and procedures in the daily
routine of its employees; 98 (3) auditing, monitoring, reporting and track-
ing systems that assess and improve environmental compliance; 9 9 (4) pro-
grams to update, train and evaluate employees regarding environmental
compliance; 100 (5) appropriate rewards provided to employees and agents
for compliance with environmental policies; 10 1 (6) appropriate discipline
of employees for violations; 10 2 and (7) continuing evaluation and im-
provement in compliance areas.103 An organization may also try to obtain
additional mitigation, up to the maximum allowed, by demonstrating in-
novative and effective approaches to compliance not covered by the re-
quired factors.1 0 4 However, in these cases, the organization bears a
difficult burden in proving that such approaches contribute to
compliance. 10 5
93. Id. § 9C1.2(c).
94. Id. § 9C1.2(a); see also id. § 9D1.1 (setting forth factors that organization
must demonstrate to establish commitment to environmental compliance).
95. See id. § 9C1.2(a) (providing for up to eight level reduction in offense
level if satisfied).
96. For a discussion of criticisms against the "Commitment to Environmental
Compliance" mitigator, see infra notes 201, 216-25 and accompanying text.
97. Proposed U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 9D1.1(a)(1). Line management in-
cludes "executive and operating officers at all levels." Id.
98. Id. § 9D1.1 (a) (2). This factor also requires that employees report sus-
pected environmental violations and that the organization keeps records of such
reports. Id.
99. Id. § 9Dl.1 (a) (3). The Proposed Guidelines envision the independent
auditing by non-line management personnel, as well as random and surprise au-
dits. Id. § 9D1.1 (a) (3) (i). Measures to protect whisfleblowers are also required.
Id. § 9D1.1 (a) (3) (iii).
100. Id. § 9D1.1(a) (4). Training and evaluation of employees must encom-
pass extra-legal requirements such as organizational policy and ethical standards.
Id. § 9D1.1(a) (4) (ii).
101. Id. § 9Dl.1 (a) (5). Other incentive-based sales and production programs
must be consistent with environmental compliance programs. Id.
102. Id. § 9Dl.1(a) (6). This includes reporting employee and agent viola-
tions to law enforcement authorities. Id.
103. Id. § 9D1.1(a) (7). The Proposed Guidelines require an organizational
process, such as "a periodic, external evaluation of the organization's overall
programmatic compliance effort," to satisfy this factor. Id.
104. Id. § 9D1.1 (a) (8). However, the Proposed Guidelines do not define "in-
novative approaches." Id.
105. Id.
19951
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If the organization fails to satisfy substantially any of the above seven
factors, then no mitigation credit under this section is awarded.10 6 Further-
more, "high-level personnel" involvement in the offense will also create a
rebuttable presumption that the organization is not committed to environ-
mental compliance. 10 7 On the other hand, if all the factors are substan-
tially satisfied, then the mitigation credit further depends on the degree
of organizational commitment and on the size and type of the
organization.1 08
d. Fine Calculation
After adjusting the offense level for mitigating factors, the court must
next determine the appropriate fine level, subject to several limitations.
i. General Calculations and Limitations
The adjusted offense level for each count is placed into an Offense
Level Fine Table 09 to determine the maximum statutory fine percentage
106. Id. § 9C1.2(a). The organization must demonstrate that all of the seven
factors were present prior to the offense in order to receive mitigation credit. Id.
107. Id. § 9C1.2(a).
"High-level personnel of the organization" are defined as individuals who
have substantial control over the organization or who have a substantial
role in the making of policy within the organization. The term includes:
a director, an executive officer, an individual in charge of a major busi-
ness or functional unit of the organization, such as sales, administration,
or finance; and an individual with a substantial ownership interest.
Id. § 9A1.2 n.2(e).
108. Id. § 9C1.2(a). For example, a very small business manager may be able
to use a checklist for an audit, informally train staff and monitor compliance dur-
ing the course of regular management duties. See id. § 9D1.1 commentary cmt. 3
(noting that "reliance on existing resources and simple systems can demonstrate
the same degree of commitment that, for a much larger organization, would re-
quire, for example, a full-time audit department, a training staff, an active compli-
ance monitoring staff, and computer systems for tracking the resolution of
compliance issues"); see also id. § 9D.1(a)(4), (5), (7) (explicitly including size
and type of organization as factors to consider).
109. Id. § 9El.1. The Proposed Guidelines set the Offense Level Fine Table
as follows:
% Max.
Offense Level Stat. Fine
0-6 10
7 10-20
8 15-25
9 20-30
10 25-35
11 30-40
12 30-50
13 35-55
14 40-60
15 45-65
16 50-70
17 55-75
14
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range from which the court can choose the fine.' 10 Mitigating factors may
not reduce the offense level by more than fifty percent.1 1 1 However, it is
possible that mitigating factors may reduce the fine amount by more than
fifty percent, except in the case of knowing endangerment violations. 1 12
The court must then choose the fine from the greater of: (1) the
amount as determined by the table, or (2) any economic gain to the cor-
poration, plus the costs directly attributed to the violation. 113 However,
the court must reduce the fine, if necessary to protect the ability of the
organization to pay restitution to the victims. 1 1 4 For example, in certain
circumstances, the court may reduce the amount if the fine "would result
in the liquidation or cessation of all or a significant part of the business
operations of the [organization] due to the [organization's] inability to
pay the fine .... "115
ii. Multiple Count Convictions
Fines for multiple counts are generally cumulative. However, a court
may treat multiple counts as a single count for sentencing purposes,1 16 if
the counts are excessively repetitive and "relat[e] to a course of offense
behavior that is ongoing or continuous in nature and does not involve
18 60-80
19 65-85
20 70-90
21 75-95
22 80-100
23 85-100
24 or more 100
Id. The Advisory Group was divided over the appropriate percentage ranges for
each offense level. Id.
110. Id. For a discussion of the maximum statutory fine under the Proposed
Guidelines, see supra note 77 and accompanying text.
111. Id. § 9E1.2(b).
112. Id. For example, suppose the adjusted offense level before mitigation
was 20, the offense was not a knowing endangerment violation and the available
mitigation credits totaled 12. The 50% offense level mitigation limitation would
reduce the final offense level to 10. This 50% reduction in offense level could
result in a 62.5% reduction in the actual fine (from 80% of maximum to 30%). Id.
§ 9E1.1 (Offense Level Fine Table). Fines for knowing endangerment violations
may be reduced by a maximum of 50% of the fine level. Id. § 9E1.2(b).
113. Id. § 9E1.2(c). The Advisory Group was divided over whether costs of
the offense should be factored in with economic gain to the organization. Id. For
a discussion of the "economic gain plus costs" theory of defining fines, see supra
notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
114. Id. § 9E1.2(d). Thus, restitution indirectly takes sentencing priority over
the imposition of fines.
115. Id. § 9E1.2(d) (1). The organization may not qualify for this reduction if
it is a "criminal purpose organization" or a recidivist. Id. § 9E1.2(d) (2), (3). In all
cases, the reduction may not be more than necessary to prevent the liquidation or
cessation of operations. Id.
116. Id. § 9E1.2(a). The organization would remain convicted of multiple
counts but would be fined as if convicted of a single count, with the fine to be
divided proportionately among the repetitive counts. Id.
1995] COMMENT 527
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'independent volitional acts.' ",117 For example, negligent discharge of
pollutants from a leaky pipe, that lasts for several months and where no
manager knew or should have known of the discharge, should not result
in cumulative fines for each day of the violation. 118
Under other circumstances, if the organization violates both environ-
mental and non-environmental statutes and/or regulations, the fines for
the offenses "should be" determined separately, using the respective appli-
cable Guidelines.11 9 However, for "closely interrelated offenses,"1 20 the
fine is based on whichever offense carries the greater fine and then is ad-
justed by any specific offense characteristics of the lesser-fined offense. 12 1
For example, a conspiracy to conceal discharge violations and conceal-
ment of a discharge violation in furtherance of the conspiracy are "closely
interrelated offenses."12 2 Accordingly, the fine is based upon the offense
with the heightened fine amount and adjusted using the offense charac-
teristics of the lesser offense.
117. Id. § 9E1.2(a). The Proposed Guidelines do not define "independent
volitional acts," but do provide the following example: An organization intention-
ally dumps pollutants into a river for a "sustained period." Failure to fix this
known violation, once known to the organization, should constitute independent
volitional acts. Id. § 9E1.2 commentary cmt. 2. The court should also consider
clear negligence by an organization in failing to detect the violation. Id.
118. Id. § 9E1.2 commentary cmt. 1. However, the court must make sure the
total fine reflects distinct violations, the seriousness of the violations and the or-
ganization's culpability. Id. § 9E1.2(a).
119. Id. § 9B2.1(b) commentary n.2.
120. "Closely interrelated offenses" are defined as "[a]ll counts involving sub-
stantially the same harm." U.S.S.G., supra note 25, § 3D1.2. Counts involve sub-
stantially the same harm if they meet any of the following situations:
(a) When counts involve the same victim and the same act or
transaction.
(b) When counts involve the same victim and two or more acts or trans-
actions connected by a common criminal objective or constituting part of
a common scheme or plan.
(c) When one of the counts embodies conduct that is treated as a Spe-
cific offense characteristic in, or other adjustment to, the guideline appli-
cable to another of the counts.
(d) When the offense level is determined largely on the basis of the total
amount of harm or loss ... or some other measure of aggregate harm, or
if the offense behavior is ongoing or continuous in nature and the of-
fense guideline is written to cover such behavior.
Id. at § 3D1.2(a)-(d).
121. Proposed U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 9B1.2(b) commentary n.2.
122. See U.S.S.G., supra note 25, § 3D1.2 n.4, ex. 1 (providing similar example
for extortion). The two offenses are "closely interrelated" under subsection (b) of
§ 3D1.2. Id.
[Vol. 40: p. 513
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B. Probation
1. When Probation is Imposed
After determining the applicable fines, a court may impose a sentence
of probation on an organization. 12 3 However, the Proposed Guidelines
require courts to impose probation in any of the following circumstances:
(1) to ensure that the organization will be able to pay the fine imposed; 12 4
(2) to implement penalties such as restitution, remedial orders or commu-
nity service; 125 (3) when the organization does not have a compliance pro-
gram; 126 (4) to reduce the likelihood of future violations; 12 7 (5) when the
organization engaged in similar misconduct within the last five years; 128
(6) when the same high-level personnel participated in both the offense
and similar misconduct within the last five years; 129 (7) when the organiza-
tion is not fined;' 3 0 or (8) when other sentencing purposes will be fur-
thered.1 31 The term of probation must not be longer than five years, but
it must be at least one year if the offense is a felony.' 32
2. Probation Conditions
If the court imposes probation, the Proposed Guidelines provide for
both mandatory and permissive conditions, depending on the type of of-
fense and the reason for probation. An example of a mandatory condi-
tion is a requirement that an organization shall not commit a crime
during probation.' 33 Further, if the court imposes probation for a felony,
then it must impose at least one of the following conditions: a fine, restitu-
123. Id. § 8B1 (providing that court may impose probation as a remedy for
criminal conduct).
124. Proposed U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 9FL. (a) (1).
125. Id. These penalties may be imposed for environmental violations under
the existing Organizational Guidelines. For a discussion of the existing Organiza-
tional Guidelines, see supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
126. Id. § 9Fl.1 (a)(3). For a discussion of what constitutes a compliance pro-
gram, see supra notes 97-103 and accompanying text.
127. Id. § 9Fl.1 (a) (4).
128. Id. § 9F1.1 (a)(5). The Advisory Group was divided over whether civil
and administrative violations should be considered for purposes of imposing
mandatory probation for similar organizational misconduct. Id. For a definition
of "similar misconduct," see supra note 87.
129. Id. § 9Fl.1 (a) (6).
130. Id. § 9Fl.1(a)(7).
131. Id. § 9Fl.l(a) (8). These other purposes of sentencing are set forth in 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2).
132. Id. § 9F1.2(a)(1), (2). The term of probation should not be longer
"than necessary to accomplish the court's specific objective in imposing ... proba-
tion." Id. commentary, application note.
133. Id. § 9F1.3(a) (referring to statutory conditions of probation in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3563(a) (1)).
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don, community service or one of the alternative conditions specified in
the federal probationary statute.
1 34
When a court sentences an organization to probation because it lacks
an effective environmental compliance program, or because the court
wants to ensure that future violations are unlikely to occur, the court must
require the organization to develop a compliance program. 135 The pro-
gram must be satisfactory both to the court and to the government.1 36
Along with that condition, the organization is required to inform its em-
ployees, its shareholders and the public of its offense and subsequent com-
pliance program.1 37 The organization also must report periodically to
the government on its compliance activities and may have to allow the
government to review its books, records, facilities and compliance
activities.13 8
In addition to the preceding conditions of probation, the Proposed
Guidelines permit other probationary conditions. A court has discretion
to impose any probationary conditions that "(1) are reasonably related to
the nature and circumstances of the offense or the history and characteris-
tics of the organization; and (2) involve only such deprivations of liberty
or property as are necessary to effect the purposes of sentencing." 13 9 This
discretion could include requiring the publication of the offense.140
IV. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
A. Comparison to the First Draft
The most significant change in the Proposed Guidelines from the
First Draft is the change in the basic fine structure and method of compu-
tation. First, the two drafts differ as to the proper method of calculating
the base fine. The First Draft defined the base fine (before aggravation
and mitigation) as the greater of: (1) the determined percentage of the
maximum statutory fine; or (2) "economic gain plus CoSt. ' 14 1 Under the
134. Id. § 9F1.3(b) (referring to 18 U.S.C. § 3563(a) (2), (b)). The court im-
poses the alternative statutory conditions only if it finds that a fine, restitution, or
community service is unreasonable due to "extraordinary circumstances." Id.
135. Id. § 9F1.3(d). This is one of the most severely criticized aspects of the
Proposed Guidelines. For a discussion of the criticisms, see infra notes 201, 216-
225 and accompanying text.
136. Id. § 9F1.3(d)(1), (2), (4). If the proposed program is unsatisfactory,
the court may use experts (at the organization's expense) to develop a satisfactory
program. Id. § 9F1.3(d) (3).
137. Id. § 9F1.3(d) (5).
138. Id. § 9F1.3(d)(6), (7).
139. Id. § 9F1.3(c). For example, the court may require the organization to
report all of its financial transactions and records if necessary to ensure that mone-
tary penalties are paid. Id. § 9F1.3(e) (1)-(3).
140. Id. § 9F1.4 policy statement.
141. See First Draft, supra note 2, Step I(a) (presenting calculations for initial
baseline determinations).
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Proposed Guidelines, the final fine is the greater of these two amounts. 142
Thus, aggravating and mitigating factors would have applied to fines based
on "economic gain plus cost" under the First Draft,143 but under the Pro-
posed Guidelines such factors apply only to the offense levels, not to "eco-
nomic gain plus cost" determinations. 144
Second, the two drafts quantify offense levels, along with aggravators
and mitigators differently. Instead of using numerical offense levels for
specific offense types as in the Proposed Guidelines, the First Draft estab-
lished base percentage ranges for fines.145 For example, knowing endan-
germent offenses resulted in a base percentage of 90 to 100% of the
maximum statutory fine. 146 Under the Proposed Guidelines, such of-
fenses result in a base offense level of twenty-four, which then is used to
determine the fine percentage. 147 However, either approach results in
approximately the same fine amount, absent any aggravating or mitigating
circumstances. 
148
Similar to the computation of percentage ranges for offenses, the
First Draft specified aggravating and mitigating factors in terms of percent-
ages. 149 Under the First Draft, aggravating factors could have increased
the base fine to greater than the statutory maximum. 150 This result is not
possible under the Proposed Guidelines because they set the upper limit
of the base fine as the statutory maximum. 151
142. Proposed U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 9E1.2(c). This fine is subject to other
limitations, however. For a discussion of the limitations on fines, see supra notes
113-22 and accompanying text.
143. See First Draft, supra note 2, Steps II and III (demonstrating how aggra-
vating and mitigating factors cause adjustments in base fine).
144. See Proposed U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 9C (requiring that aggravating and
mitigating factors adjust offense level, not fine based on "economic gain plus
cost").
145. First Draft, supra note 2, Step I(a)(2) (Base Fine Table). No offense
types in the First Draft, included specific offense characteristics, unlike certain cat-
egories under the Proposed Guidelines. Id. For a discussion of specific offense
characteristics in the Proposed Guidelines, see supra notes 80-84 and accompany-
ing text.
146. Id. Step I(a) (2) (a) (presenting base percentage range for knowing en-
dangerment offenses).
147. See Proposed U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 9B2.1 (b) (1) (A) (knowing endan-
germent offenses result in base offense level of 24).
148. Under the Proposed Guidelines, a knowing endangerment offense (base
offense level-24), without aggravating or mitigating circumstances, results in a fine
of 100% of the statutory maximum. Id. § 9El.1 (Offense Level Fine Table). For
more discussion on determining the fine amount, see supra notes 74-122 and ac-
companying text.
149. First Draft, supra note 2, Step II. The First Draft did not, however, con-
tain specific percentage ranges for any aggravating or mitigating factor. Id.
150. See id. (showing how aggravating factors increase base fine with no theo-
retical limit in either this Step or elsewhere in First Draft, even if base fine was
determined from "economic gain plus cost").
151. See Proposed U.S.S.G., supra note 1, §§ 9C, 9E1.1 (aggravating factors
increase offense level, but Offense Level Fine Table creates 100% ceiling on per-
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Third, the First Draft limited the effect of mitigating factors differ-
ently than the Proposed Guidelines. Under the First Draft, mitigating fac-
tors could not have reduced the fine below "the greater of (a) fifty percent
[50%] of the Base Fine ... or (b) the economic gain from the offense
.... "152 With the Proposed Guidelines, mitigating factors reduce the of-
fense level, but not the base fine, and can result in fines of less than fifty
percent of the primary offense level's corresponding "base fine. 1 53 In
addition, the Proposed Guidelines contain fewer aggravating and mitigat-
ing factors than the First Draft. 154
Finally, the Proposed Guidelines omit parts of the First Draft. The
most significant omissions, at least in the context of theories of organiza-
tional sentencing, are the aggravating factor of scienter 155 and the mitigat-
ing factor of absence of scienter. 156 The First Draft's scienter aggravator
provided for an increase in the base fine if an organization's employees or
agents "knowingly' 57 engaged in conduct that violated the law under cir-
cumstances that evidenced at least a reckless indifference to legal require-
ments."158 Conversely, the absence of scienter mitigator reduced the base
centage of maximum statutory fine). For the body of the Offense Level Fine Ta-
ble, see supra note 109.
152. First Draft, supra note 2, Step IV(a). The commentary to the First Draft
provides the following example: If the base fine equaled $1,000,000 and the eco-
nomic gain to the corporation was $600,000, mitigating factors could not reduce
the fine below $600,000 (the gain to the corporation). Id. at commentary cmt. 1.
However, if the economic gain was less than $500,000, mitigating factors could not
reduce the fine below $500,000 (50% of base fine). Id.
153. For a discussion of the impact of mitigating factors in the fine calcula-
tion, under the Proposed Guidelines, see supra notes 91-108 and accompanying
text.
154. Compare First Draft, supra note 2, Step 11(c) (presenting aggravating fac-
tor of "threat to human life or safety") with Proposed U.S.S.G., supra note 1,
§ 9B2.1 (b) (3) (B) (ii) (creating "substantial likelihood of death or serious bodily
injury" as specific offense characteristic resulting in offense level increase of 11).
Among the aggravating factors that did not survive revision of the First Draft are:
threat to the environment, threat to human life or safety, scienter and absence of a
permit. See First Draft, supra note 2, Step II(b)-(d), (j) (setting forth these factors).
However, some of the omitted aggravating factors did become specific offense
characteristics under the Proposed Guidelines. The Proposed Guidelines also
eliminated the First Draft's mitigating factor of absence of scienter. See id. Step
II(m) (setting forth this mitigating factor).
155. First Draft, supra note 2, Step I(d).
156. Id. Step II(m).
157. For this aggravator, "knowingly" meant a certain degree of knowledge
about the criminal nature of the conduct. Id. Step 11(d), commentary. This is a
different definition of "knowingly" than followed by certain courts in organiza-
tional liability cases. For the definition of knowingly used by some courts in orga-
nizational liability cases, see supra notes 52-60 and accompanying text.
158. Id. Step 1(d). The degree of aggravation would have depended on (1)
the level of intent; (2) the level of employee who "knowingly" violated the statute;
(3) how many employees "knew" and to what extent they knew of the violation;
and (4) whether the violator was a "rogue employee," acting primarily for non-
organizational purposes. Id. commentary.
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fine, if the government did not prove reckless indifference (or "greater"
intent) and the organization was strictly liable. 159 In contrast, the Pro-
posed Guidelines do not address, and thus, do not consider, the presence
or absence of scienter as a respective aggravator or mitigator.
Apart from these major differences, the Proposed Guidelines track
the language of the First Draft closely. Other than the above described
differences, every significant definition remains the same. 160 For exam-
ple, both drafts contain essentially the same provisions regarding the
"Commitment to Environmental Compliance" and organizational proba-
tion, with the exception that the Proposed Guidelines allow for some addi-
tional compliance mitigation credit if an organization successfully uses
innovative approaches to environmental compliance.'
6 1
B. Comparison to the Organizational Guidelines
The Organizational Guidelines apply partially when organizations are
sentenced for environmental offenses. Courts must use the Organiza-
tional Guidelines to determine whether to order restitution, 162 remedial
orders, 163 community service,lM or notice to victims,'165 regardless of the
nature of the organizational offense. The fine provisions of the Organiza-
tional Guidelines, however, do not apply to environmental offenses.
166
When they do apply, the Organizational Guidelines use a significantly
different fine calculation method than that used by the Proposed Guide-
lines. The Organizational Guidelines define the base fine as the greater
of: (1) the appropriate amount from its Offense Level Fine Table; 16 7 (2)
the pecuniary gain to the organization; 16 8 or (3) the pecuniary loss caused
159. Id. Step II(m).
160. For a discussion of definitional and provisional differences between the
First Draft and the Proposed Guidelines, see supra notes 155-56 and accompanying
text.
161. Proposed U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 9D1.1 (a) (8). However, the signifi-
cance of this factor is limited by the heavy burden placed on the organization to
demonstrate the additional utility of innovative approaches. For a discussion of
the burden an organization bears in trying to obtain additional mitigation, see
supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
162. U.S.S.G., supra note 25, § 8B1.1. Restitution orders are designed to com-
pensate identifiable victims of the offense. Id. § 8B introductory commentary.
Restitution is mandatory under certain circumstances. Id. § 8B1.1.
163. Id. § 8B1.2. Remedial orders are designed to "remedy harm that has al-
ready occurred and to prevent future harm." Id. § 8B1.2 commentary. Remedial
orders are not mandatory under the Organizational Guidelines. See id. (noting
lack of language making remedial orders mandatory).
164. See id. § 8B1.3 (recognizing community service as non-mandatory reme-
dial device).
165. See id. § 8B1.4 (directing court to order notice to victims pursuant to
U.S.S.G., supra note 25, § 5F1.4).
166. Id. § 8C2.1 background commentary.
167. Id. § 8C2.4(a) (1); see also id. § 8C2.4(d) (setting forth Offense Level Fine
Table).
168. Id. § 8C2.4(a) (2).
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by the organization. 169 As previously discussed, the Proposed Guidelines
do not follow this process, but rather determine the base fine first and
then consider "economic gain plus CoSt." 170 Further, while using offense
levels to calculate the appropriate fine under method one above, the Or-
ganizational Guidelines match offense levels with a specific fine amount,
not with a percentage of the statutory maximum fine like under the Pro-
posed Guidelines. 171
In addition to its different method of fine calculation, the Organiza-
tional Guidelines treat aggravating and mitigating factors differently than
the Proposed Guidelines. Under the Organizational Guidelines, aggravat-
ing and mitigating factors are used in a separate determination of an or-
ganization's "culpability score."1 7 2  Factors that can increase the
culpability score include an organization's size, coupled with personnel
tolerance of and involvement in the offense, an organization's prior his-
tory, the violation of an order and an organization's obstruction of jus-
tice.1 73 Factors decreasing the culpability score include an effective
compliance program, organizational cooperation, self-reporting of the vio-
lation and organizational acceptance of responsibility.174 The adjusted
culpability score results in minimum and maximum "multipliers" of the
base fine, which in turn determine the appropriate fine range.' 75 Thus,
in some cases, aggravating factors may increase the base fine by more than
one hundred percent,' 76 while mitigating factors may in some cases result
in a fine range of five to twenty percent of the base fine. 177 Generally,
169. See id. § 8C2.4(3) (limiting application to loss caused "intentionally,
knowingly, or recklessly").
170. For a discussion of fine determinations for non-criminal purpose organi-
zations under the Proposed Guidelines, see supra notes 78-122 and accompanying
text.
171. U.S.S.G., supra note 25, § 8C2.4(d). For example, under the Organiza-
tion Guidelines Offense Level Fine Table, an offense level of 24 "merits" a base
fine of $2,100,000. Id. Under the corresponding Proposed Guidelines table, the
adjusted fine for an offense level of 24 is the statutory maximum. Proposed
U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 9El.1.
172. U.S.S.G., supra note 25, § 8C2.5. Each organization starts with a culpabil-
ity score of five which is then adjusted according to appropriate aggravating and
mitigating circumstances. Id. § 8C2.5(a).
173. Id. § 8C2.5(b)-(e). For a discussion of aggravating circumstances under
the Proposed Guidelines, see supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
174. Id. § 8C2.5(f), (g). For a discussion of mitigating circumstances under
the Proposed Guidelines, see supra notes 91-108 and accompanying text.
175. Id. § 8C2.6. For example, an organization with a culpability score of 10
will face a fine range of two (minimum multiplier) to four (maximum multiplier)
times the base fine. Id.
176. Id. In contrast, the Proposed Guidelines do not allow aggravating factors
to increase the base fine beyond 100% of the statutory maximum. Proposed
U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 9E1.1. For a discussion of the Offense Level Fine Table
and maximum statutory fine percentages, see supra notes 109-10 and accompany-
ing text.
177. U.S.S.G., supra note 25, § 8C2.6. As is the case with the Proposed Guide-
lines, under the Organizational Guidelines, the base fine may not be reduced to
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under the Proposed Guidelines, base fine ranges are narrower. 178 For ex-
ample, the lowest adjusted offense level under the Proposed Guidelines
results in a set fine of ten percent of the statutory maximum, with no fine
range whatsoever. 179
Ultimately, the Organizational Guidelines limit fines to the statutory
maximum, regardless of whether the base fine was determined by pecuni-
ary gain, pecuniary loss or the tables. 180 The Proposed Guidelines circum-
vent this limitation by requiring the minimum fine at least to equal
"economic gain plus cost," subject to general limitations other than the stat-
utory maximum. 181 For example, given a felony offense, which results in
economic/pecuniary gain to the organization of $600,000, an economic/
pecuniary loss caused by the corporation of $300,000 and an applicable
statutory maximum of $500,000,182 the Organizational Guidelines would
impose a fine of $500,000.183 Given the same circumstances, the Pro-
posed Guidelines would impose a fine of $900,000.184 This result demon-
strates, therefore, that the Proposed Guidelines attempt to circumvent
statutory maximums.
The Organizational Guidelines and the Proposed Guidelines also dif-
fer substantially in their respective treatment of compliance programs.
The Organizational Guidelines state that an effective compliance program
operates as a mitigator in determining the culpability score, but they do
not define or describe such a program. 185 In addition, high-level person-
nel participation in the offense precludes application of this mitigator
zero by mitigating factors. Id.; Proposed U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 9El.1 (Offense
Level Fine Table) (creating 10% minimum statutory fine, if imposed). The 50%
offense level reduction limitation for mitigation under the Proposed Guidelines
has no comparable equivalent under the Organizational Guidelines.
178. See Proposed U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 9El.1 (indicating percentage
ranges of maximum statutory fine).
179. See id. § 9E1.1 (Offense Fine Level Table) (setting fine at 10% of statu-
tory maximum for offense levels zero to six).
180. U.S.S.G., supra note 25, § 8C3.1 (b) ("Where the minimum guideline fine
is greater than the maximum fine authorized by statute, the maximum fine author-
ized by statute shall be the guideline fine.").
181. Proposed U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 9E1.2(c). For a discussion of fine cal-
culations under the Proposed Guidelines, see supra notes 78-122 and accompany-
ing text.
182. 18 U.S.C. § 3571(c) (1988). Five hundred thousand dollars is the felony
default maximum under this statute, as long as the substantive offense does not
provide for a greater maximum. Id. For a discussion of the Proposed Guidelines
approach to statutory maximum fines, see supra note 77 and accompanying text.
183. For further discussion of fine determinations under the Organizational
Guidelines, see supra notes 167-69 and accompanying text.
184. For a discussion of fine determinations under the Proposed Guidelines,
see supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
185. U.S.S.G., supra note 25, § 8C2.5(f). In contrast, the Proposed Guidelines
set out seven detailed requirements for a compliance program to earn mitigation
credit. Proposed U.S.S.G., supra note 1, §§ 9C1.2(a), 9D1.1(a)(1)-(7). For a dis-
cussion of the Proposed Guidelines' approach to compliance programs, see supra
notes 95-108 and accompanying text.
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under the Organizational Guidelines. Under the Proposed Guidelines,
however, it results in a rebuttable presumption that the mitigator is not
satisfied.18 6 Furthermore, the development of an effective compliance
program may be a condition of probation under the Organizational
Guidelines, while the Proposed Guidelines require such a condition in cer-
tain circumstances.18 7
Despite these differences in the treatment of compliance programs,
other probation provisions of the Proposed Guidelines are virtually identi-
cal to those of the Organizational Guidelines.1 88 It is evident that the Pro-
posed Guidelines borrowed extensively from the Organizational
Guidelines for its definitional sections and, occasionally, its operational
sections.1 89
C. Extent to Which the Proposed Guidelines Fulfill the Statutory Goals of the
Sentencing Guidelines
The Sentencing Reform Act gave the Sentencing Commission the
duty to fulfill certain sentencing goals.' 9 0 This section examines how well
the Proposed Guidelines, published by the Advisory Group, meet these co-
existing, yet conflicting goals.1 9 1
186. U.S.S.G., supra note 25, § 8C2.5(f); Proposed U.S.S.G., supra note 1,
§ 9C1.2(a).
187. Compare U.S.S.G., supra note 25, § 8D1.4(c) ("If probation is ordered
under... [certain circumstances], the following conditions may be appropriate:
(1) The organization shall develop.., a [compliance] program .... " (emphasis
added)) with Proposed U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 9F1.3(d) ("If probation is ordered
under [certain circumstances], the court shall impose the conditions set forth in
this paragraph .... (1) The organization shall develop . . . a [compliance] pro-
gram .... " (emphasis added)). The "certain circumstances" in both cases include
a lack of an effective compliance program. U.S.S.G., supra note 25, § 8D1.1 (a) (3);
Proposed U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 9Fl.1(a) (3).
188. Compare U.S.S.G., supra note 25, § 8D (presenting probation provisions'
general language) with Proposed U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 9F (same).
189. Compare U.S.S.G., supra note 25, § 8C1.1 with Proposed U.S.S.G., supra
note 1, § 9B1.1. As an example of borrowing with regard to both types of sections,
the Organizational Guidelines and Proposed Guidelines have nearly identical sec-
tions regarding "criminal purpose organizations." For a discussion of criminal pur-
pose organizations under the Proposed Guidelines, see supra notes 74-77 and
accompanying text.
The First Draft more than likely borrowed from the Organizational Guide-
lines, as well. For a discussion of linguistic similarities between the First Draft and
the Proposed Guidelines, see supra notes 160-61 and accompanying text.
190. For a list of these goals and the relevant statutory provisions, see supra
notes 17-24 and accompanying text.
191. See generally RonaldJ. Maurer, Comment, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines
for Organizations: How Do They Work and What Are They Supposed to Do?, 18 U. DAY-
TON L. REv. 799, 821-832 (1993) (analyzing how well Organizational Guidelines
meet sentencing goals).
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1. Sentence Reflects Seriousness of Offense, Promotes Respect for the Law and
Provides Just Punishment
The first overriding goal of the Sentencing Guidelines is "to reflect
the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to pro-
vide just punishment for the offense. ' 19 2 The Proposed Guidelines reflect
the seriousness of the offense and promote respect for the law by having
different primary offense levels for different categories of offenses' 93 and
through increased fine percentage ranges for greater adjusted offense
levels.1 94 The severity of the fine for criminal purpose organizations also
indicates that the Proposed Guidelines consider such organizations the
most severe offenders.1 9 5
Additionally, just punishment principles anticipate a sentence that is
no more restrictive than necessary to achieve the social goals of sentenc-
ing. 196 While the social goals behind environmental sentencing presently
encourage stiffer sentences for environmental offenders, 197 characteriza-
tion of what constitutes just punishment is disputed by the proponents of
the "optimal penalties" and the "economic gain plus cost" sentencing the-
ories.1 98 The Proposed Guidelines reflect the latter approach, in that
fines must at least equal "economic gain plus cost."' 99 Potential fines
under this approach could be astronomical, in light of possible clean up
costs. However, the Proposed Guidelines' general limitations on fines en-
sure that most organizations will be able to pay imposed fines and con-
tinue to operate. 200
Furthermore, the Proposed Guidelines' treatment of compliance pro-
grams as conditions of probation also conflicts with the goal ofjust punish-
192. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2) (A) (1988); see also 28 U.S.C. § 991(b) (1) (A)
(1988) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)).
193. For a discussion of primary offense levels under the Proposed Guide-
lines, see supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
194. For a discussion of fine range determinations under the Proposed
Guidelines, see supra notes 113-22 and accompanying text.
195. See Proposed U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 9B1.1 (stating that fine for crimi-
nal purpose organizations shall be equivalent to net assets of organization, subject
to statutory maximums). For a discussion of criminal purpose organizations, see
supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
196. See Maurer, supra note 191, at 830 (discussing purposes and implementa-
tion of just punishment in context of Organizational Guidelines).
197. See BNA, Environmental Law Sentencing Guidelines Being Rewritten, Commis-
sioner Tells ABA, NAT'L ENV'T DAiLY, Sept. 13, 1993 (referring to revision process
after First Draft). Commissioner Ilene Nagel stated that "Congress is the driving
force behind this, and some members have said [that] this is an area that deserves
attention. Scuttling the guidelines is not an option in a real political world." Id.
198. For a discussion of these theories, see supra notes 58-65 and accompany-
ing text.
199. Proposed U.S.S.G. § 9E1.2(c). For a discussion of the Proposed Guide-
lines theory, see supra notes 58-65 and accompanying text.
200. Id. § 9E1.2(d) (stating limits do not apply to criminal purpose organiza-
tions and recidivists). For a discussion of general limitations on fines, see supra
notes 109-15 and accompanying texts.
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ment. Imposing the development of a compliance program as a condition
of probation in actuality works a "hidden fine" on the organization in
terms of added costs.20 ' If an organization must develop a compliance
program, the cost of such a program should be estimated and serve as a
reduction of any fine imposed. Alternatively, the court could reserve juris-
diction over reducing the fine when the cost of such a program is demon-
strated by the organization.
2. Sentence Adequately Deters Criminal Conduct and Protects the Public from
Further Crimes
The Proposed Guidelines strongly emphasize deterrence and the pre-
vention of further crimes through the "carrot and stick" approach found
in the provisions defining specific offense characteristics, aggravating fac-
tors and mitigating factors. This approach is especially true for the "Com-
mitment to Environmental Compliance provision."20 2 All of the required
factors comprising this mitigator are designed to make the organization
comply with environmental requirements and thus to self-deter future
criminal conduct, as well as to encourage the self-reporting of viola-
tions.2 03 As for the "carrot" aspect encouraging self-deterrence and self-
reporting, an organization can earn an eight level reduction in the ad-
justed offense level for having a satisfactory compliance program, even if a
violation occurs. 204 The complementary "stick" aspect is that an organiza-
tion lacking a compliance program may face an increase of the adjusted
offense level by four,20 5 with the added requirement of developing an ef-
fective compliance program as a condition of probation (resulting in
more costs to the organization). 206
In addition, the Proposed Guidelines impose costs for non-deterrence
through specific offense characteristics and aggravating factors such as
prior criminal and civil compliance histories. 20 7 Further, courts cannot
201. See id. § 9D1.1 (a) (describing steps that need to be taken to satisfy "Com-
mitment to Environmental Compliance"). Additional hidden costs in the compli-
ance programs, include developing the program, paying for any court-appointed
experts, program implementation and revision, transactional costs for making
records and facilities available to courts and the government. Id.
202. See id. §§ 9C1.2(a), 9D (encouraging deterrence and prevention of fu-
ture crime by use of aggravating and mitigating factors in area of compliance).
203. See id. § 9D1.1 (a) (1)-(7) (noting factors required for present and future
compliance, including self-auditing, self-reporting, self-discipline and self-
improvement).
204. Proposed U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 9C1.2(a). However, the reduction
may not actually be eight levels because of the degree of substantial compliance
and the general limitations on mitigation. Id. §§ 9C1.2(a), 9E1.2(b). For a discus-
sion on the mitigating factors, see supra notes 91-108 and accompanying text.
205. Id. § 9C1.1(f).
206. Id. § 9Fl.l(a) (3).
207. Id. § 9C1.1(b),(c).
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reduce fines due to an organization's "inability" to pay the fine if the or-
ganization is a recidivist.208
3. Sentence Adequately Rehabilitates Defendant
Another sentencing goal is "to provide the defendant with needed
educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional
treatment in the most effective manner. '20 9 Because the Proposed Guide-
lines deal only with organizations, the organizations themselves can be
given only "other correctional treatment."2 10 This goal is accomplished
through probation. Courts must impose probation when "advisable to en-
sure that changes are made within the organization to reduce the likeli-
hood of future criminal conduct. 2 1'
If probation is imposed to make such changes, a mandatory condition
of such probation is the development of an effective compliance pro-
gram.2 12 Such a condition will rehabilitate the organization by making it
more likely that future violations will be detected, if not prevented.2 1 3
However, the goal of rehabilitating the organization through required
compliance program development and implementation conflicts with the
goal of just punishment as discussed earlier.214
4. Sentences Are Certain and Fair
The Sentencing Reform Act also proposed that guidelines provide
certain and fair sentences.2 1 5 The Proposed Guidelines attempt to com-
promise between absolute certainty and uncertainty, and between cer-
tainty and fairness. For example, the Proposed Guidelines impose fines
from $50,000 to $500,000 per offense if "economic gain plus costs" and
other limitations are ignored.2 16 This approach provides for a more cer-
208. See id. § 9E1.2(d) (3) (disallowing permissive reductions in fine if organi-
zation has engaged in "sustained pattern of serious environmental violations").
209. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2) (D) (1988).
210. See Maurer, supra note 191, at 831-32 (noting that organizations cannot
rationally receive educational and vocational training). However, individuals
within the organization may be given educational and vocational training through
effective compliance programs. Id.
211. Proposed U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 9F1.I(a)(4). For a more complete
discussion of probation for organizations convicted of environmental offenses, see
supra notes 123-40 and accompanying text.
212. Id. § 9F1.3(d). For a discussion of an effective compliance program
under the Proposed Guidelines, see supra notes 97-103 and accompanying text.
213. See id. § 9F1.3(d) (1) (requiring condition that program be effective
enough "to detect and prevent future violations of law").
214. For discussion on the goal of just punishment, see supra notes 192-201
and accompanying text.
215. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b) (1) (B) (1988).
216. See Proposed U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 9E1.1 (Offense Level Fine Table)
(stating minimum and maximum percentages of maximum statutory fine). The
smallest maximum statutory fine, determined with reference to 18 U.S.C.
§ 3571(c), and ignoring subpart (d), as directed by the Commentary to the Pro-
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tain range of fines than that currently provided by the Organizational
Guidelines.2 17 Further, prescribed offense levels, specific offense charac-
teristics, definitional sections and specific step-by-step fine calculations in-
evitably lead to more certainty than the current rather ad-hoc system.
2 18
In addition, fairness to the public, including organizations, is consis-
tent with just punishment.2 19 Presumably, the public, and organizations,
would consider it unfair if its desires were frustrated by the Proposed
Guidelines. As a result, the Proposed Guidelines attempt to be fair to or-
ganizations by reducing fines for mitigating factors22 0 and generally by
trying to make sure that non-criminal purpose and non-recidivist organiza-
tions are not driven out of business by excessive fines.221
However, the imposition of "hidden" costs, by requiring organizations
to create effective compliance programs while not otherwise recognizing
these costs, perpetuates unfairness in the Proposed Guidelines. A court's
failure to consider other costs,22 2 such as previously imposed civil fines,
may not be only unfair, but in certain circumstances, also a violation of
constitutional double jeopardy and due process rights.22 3 Likewise, it is
arguably unfair to disallow mitigation when the organization is held
strictly liable,224 especially if such a conviction results in the same fine as if
posed Guidelines, is $500,000. See Proposed U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 9E, n.2. This
calculation excludes offenses for which fines are determined per day, such as con-
tinuous intentional dumping of pollutants. Id. cmt 2. The minimum fine is the
minimum percentage (10%) multiplied by the smallest maximum statutory fine
($500,000), which equals $50,000. See id. § 9E1.1 (determining minimum fine per-
centage from Offense Level Fine Table). The greatest fine is the greatest percent
(100%) multiplied by the greatest statutory fine ($500,000), which equals
$500,000. See id. (determining maximum fine percentage from Offense Level Fine
Table).
217. See Otto G. Obermaier, A Practical Partnership, NAT'L LJ., Nov. 11, 1991,
at 13 (noting uncertain range in Organizational Guidelines). Under similar as-
sumptions, the Organizational Guidelines could impose fines from $250 to
$290,000,000. Id.
218. Some cases, however, could lead to greater consumption ofjudicial time
and resources as a result of increased judicial sentencing determinations.
219. For a discussion ofjust punishment, see supra notes 61-65 and accompa-
nying text.
220. For a discussion of mitigating factors, see supra notes 91-108 and accom-
panying text.
221. Proposed U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 9E1.2(d). For a discussion of fine lim-
itations based on the future viability of an organization, see supra note 114 and
accompanying text.
222. See generally Proposed U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 9E. The Proposed Guide-
lines do not require the courts to consider such costs in their fine or probation
determinations, nor have anything to say on the subject.
223. See, e.g., United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 446-53 (1989) (holding
that under double jeopardy and multiple punishment analysis, in certain circum-
stances, defendant may not be subject to disproportionately large civil sanction, if
defendant has already been criminally punished for same conduct).
224. For a discussion of the scienter mitigator in the First Draft, see supra
notes 155-59 and accompanying text.
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convicted for a similar offense but where high-level personnel in the or-
ganization also intended criminal consequences. 225
Finally, the auditing requirements of the "Commitment to Environ-
mental Compliance" mitigator do not promote fair sentences.2 26 The Pro-
posed Guidelines require audits as a component of the compliance
mitigator, but do not ensure that such audits will not be used against the
organization in a subsequent prosecution.2 2 7 Organizations that self-audit
and self-report may thus self-prosecute. Consequently, it might be in an
organization's best interest to self-audit less thoroughly. 228
Voluntary organizational audits, therefore, should receive immunity
against use in federal environmental prosecutions under the Proposed
Guidelines. Several state statutes grant limited voluntary audit immu-
nity.2 29 The federal agencies responsible for environmental enforcement
(the Environmental Protection Agency and the Department ofJustice) op-
pose such immunity, primarily because it would force prosecutors to bear
the heavy burden of demonstrating that their evidence did not come from
an immunized, voluntary audit.
23 0
5. Avoid Sentencing Disparities Among Similarly Situated Defendants While
Allowing Individualized Sentences
Lastly, the other purposes of the Sentencing Reform Act include at-
tempts to avoid sentencing disparities among similarly situated defendants
while allowing individualized sentences when warranted.23 ' These pur-
poses are generally met in the same manner as the concerns regarding
225. The alternative view is that any change should originate from the intent
standard of the substantive offense, not the sentencing of the offense itself. For a
discussion of this approach and other views of corporate vicarious liability, see
supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
226. See Proposed U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 9D1.1 (a) (3) (presenting auditing
requirements but permitting no immunity provisions). For a general discussion of
such auditing requirements, see supra note 99 and accompanying text.
227. See id. § 9D1.1(a) (3) (noting lack of immunity provision). Instead, the
Proposed Guidelines provide for mitigation credit if this factor and all other fac-
tors involved in the "Commitment to Environmental Compliance" mitigator are
substantially satisfied. Id. § 9C1.2(a).
228. See, e.g., William E. Callahan, The Best Intentions: Liability for Environmental
Crimes, SMALL Bus. REP., July 1994, at 9 (indicating that organizations were con-
cerned that their records "could be subpoenaed and used against them"); BNA,
EPA, DOJ Hear Debate on Protecting Environmental Audits from Disclosure, DAILY REP.
FOR ExEcuTrIvEs, July 28, 1994, § A, at 143 (indicating that firms might do audits
differently if subject to disclosure and that atmosphere of "adversarial enforce-
ment" would pervade as opposed to "cooperative compliance").
229. Intent, Knowledge Key to Prosecution of Corporate Officers, DOJ Official Says,
supra note 55, at 33.
230. Id. Under the Supreme Court's decision in Kastigar v. United States, pros-
ecutors would have a heavy burden of showing that their evidence had a source
independent of the immunized materials. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441,
461-62 (1972).
231. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (1988).
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certainty of sentencing.2 3 2 However, the definition and potential applica-
tion of fine provisions regarding "criminal purpose organizations" demon-
strate that the Proposed Guidelines do not fully serve the purposes of
avoiding sentencing disparities and allowing individualized sentences. 2 33
"Criminal purpose organizations" are those "operated primarily for a
criminal purpose or primarily by criminal means. s2 3 4 The Proposed
Guidelines do not further define the terms "operated primarily." Does it
mean that an organization must receive over fifty percent of its revenue
from criminal ventures to be considered a "criminal purpose organiza-
tion"? Or is a lesser percent appropriate?2 33 The Proposed Guidelines
should be more specific in defining "criminal purpose organizations." Ad-
ded specificity would help to prevent extreme sentencing disparity, such as
when one organization receives a simple fine while another similarly situ-
ated organization is divested of all its net assets. 236
V. CONCLUSION
The Proposed Guidelines for environmental offenses committed by
organizations provide a sound basis for actual guidelines, if enacted. They
generally meet the statutory goals of the Sentencing Reform Act, especially
certainty of sentencing and deterrence. Furthermore, they have evolved
into a more simple structure than the Organizational Guidelines or the
First Draft. However, several changes should be made. This Comment
proposes that the Sentencing Commission amend the Proposed Guide-
lines to account for relative degrees of scienter, in the interest of fairness
to organizations with lesser degrees of culpability. In addition, the Sen-
232. For a general discussion of how the Proposed Guidelines meet the cer-
tainty purpose of the Sentencing Reform Act, see supra notes 215-18 and accompa-
nying text.
233. See Maurer, spra note 191, at 825-26 (criticizing Organizational Guide-
lines on same grounds). Maurer's criticism is equally applicable to the Proposed
Guidelines because the Proposed Guidelines define "criminal purpose organiza-
tions" exactly the same way as defined in the Organizational Guidelines. See Pro-
posed U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 9B1.1 (presenting definition of criminal purpose
organization and fine determination); see also U.S.S.G., supra note 25, § 8C1.1
(presenting similar definition and fine determination for Organizational
Guidelines).
234. Proposed U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 9B1.1. This section further deter-
mines that "criminal purpose organizations" shall be stripped of their net assets,
subject to statutory maximums. Id. For a thorough discussion of "criminal pur-
pose organizations," see supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
235. See Maurer, supra note 191, at 832 (suggesting, in context of Organiza-
tional Guidelines, that minimum income percentage derived from criminal activi-
ties is one factor for court to consider in determining whether organization is
"criminal purpose organization").
236. See Proposed U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 9B1.1 (divesting "criminal purpose
organization" of net assets); see also id. § 9El.1 (calculating fines for other organi-
zations with general limitation preventing fine from causing organization to cease
operations); Maurer, supra note 191, at 826 (describing similar potential sentenc-
ing disparity in context of Organizational Guidelines).
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tencing Commission should amend and specify the attributes of "criminal
purpose organizations" to prevent unwarranted disparities in sentencing.
Finally, the Sentencing Commission should grant organizational immunity
for voluntary environmental auditing, to facilitate cooperation between
business and government in detecting and preventing environmental
violations.
The Proposed Guidelines are a solid start towards fulfilling the goal of
the Sentencing Reform Act in relation to organizational environmental
offenses. In today's cloudy political climate, however, only time will tell if
the Proposed Guidelines will be enacted. Even then, only time will allow
us to determine whether the Proposed Guidelines will be effective in sen-
tencing organizations convicted of environmental crimes.
Robert L. Kracht
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